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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the current standing of humanitarian ethics from two different, and yet interrelated 
perspectives. The first argues that shortcomings of humanitarianism are symptoms of deeper social and political 
problems inextricably linked to the nature of humanitarian practices, while the second takes notion of 
humanitarian compassion as the primary moral (and political) disposition of the 21st century individual under 
critical scrutiny. By bringing inconsistencies of humanitarianism into the spotlight I show how humanitarianism 
has become a language that inextricably serves to govern human beings. Hence, by disclosing pathologies 
internal to the humanitarian system, I hope that I am at the same time pointing at things that a reimagined 
humanitarianism needs to avoid. Ultimately, I argue that this is only possible if we rethink the objectives and 
nature of humanitarian assistance today. Instead of falling prey to unhealthy dependencies of crisis relief and 
pathologies that it engenders, humanitarianism should focus on restoring the autonomy of those affected by 
humanitarian crises and foster further development of their social environment and individual capabilities. A 
satisfactory humanitarian regime should enable people to help themselves and their communities, particularly 
through improving their sustainability and resilience in the face of increasing global challenges and 
vulnerabilities. 
Keywords: humanitarianism, humanitarian ethics, compassion, development, resilience, humanitarian 
sustainability 
RESUME 
Cet article explore le statut actuel de l'éthique humanitaire sous deux perspectives différentes et pourtant 
interdépendantes. La première affirme que les faiblesses de l'humanisme sont le symptôme de problèmes sociaux 
et politiques plus profonds inextricablement liés à la nature des pratiques humanitaires, tandis que la seconde 
prend la notion de compassion humanitaire comme la principale disposition morale (et politique) de l'individu du 
XXIe siècle et la soumet à un examen critique. En mettant en lumière les incohérences de l'humanitaire, je montre 
comment l'humanitaire est devenu un langage qui sert inextricablement à gouverner les êtres humains. Par 
conséquent, en dévoilant des pathologies internes au système humanitaire, j'espère que je pointe en même temps 
les éléments à éviter pour un humanisme réimaginé. En fin de compte, je soutiens que cela n’est possible que si 
nous repensons les objectifs et la nature de l’aide humanitaire aujourd’hui. Au lieu de devenir la proie de 
dépendances malsaines des secours en cas de crise et de pathologies qu’ils engendrent, l’action humanitaire 
devrait viser à restaurer l’autonomie des personnes touchées par les crises humanitaires et favoriser le 
développement de leur environnement social et de leurs capacités individuelles. Un régime humanitaire 
satisfaisant devrait permettre aux populations de s'aider et d'aider leurs communautés, notamment en améliorant 
leur durabilité et leur résilience face aux défis et aux vulnérabilités mondiales croissantes. 
Mots clés: humanitaire, éthique humanitaire, compassion, développement, résilience, durabilité humanitaire 
 







Today more than 130 million people across the world need humanitarian assistance and 
protection. Their lives depend on the capacity of affluent societies to acknowledge their 
needs, and respond adequately to their suffering. Such a response is not only a matter of 
ethical deliberation, it strikes clear political chords, especially when we ask a difficult 
question of responsibility or justice in the face of such severe human deprivation across the 
globe. Any radical alternative to the urgent humanitarian circumstances needs to consider the 
tumultuous dynamics between history and our present reality. The cumulative effects of 
population growth, environmental degradation, rising inequalities, colonial history, increased 
resource scarcity, economic and geopolitical shifts, violence, and ongoing developments in 
technology are presenting the humanitarian sector with difficult challenges. Challenges that 
will impact the lives of the most vulnerable sectors of humanity for the most part. When we 
consider the lives of people who comprise today’s humanitarian target, they are the 
embodiment of an increasingly harmful global interconnectedness between towering 
inequalities, historical hegemonies and human vulnerability that these relations of power 
nourish. For much of the last decade, witnessing the humanitarian crises unfolding at the 
Western European doorstep has turned into a fundamental crisis of solidarity with people in 
need and the failure of humanitarian practices in general.
1
 
I take this crisis of solidarity as a starting point in addressing a complex moral and political 
nature of our humanitarian present. I understand humanitarianism as an organizational 
structure that articulates a specific ethical discourse and offers a site wherein different 
dimensions of moral, economic and political intersect with and determine one another. In the 
contemporary world, the discourse of affects and humanitarian values offers a high political 
return. This ongoing attempt to treat humanitarianism as a symbol of what is good about the 
world - as the world’s superego, an echo of the possibility of a more humane world - tends to 
conceal inequalities on which humanitarianism draws its purpose and validity. Humanitarian 
language has steadily increased over the last few decades due to the fact that after a century 
of ideologies and bloodshed, it still offers a seductive simplification of our reality without 
real commitment to action. Sympathy can allow an entire generation to imagine the 
discovery and expression of solidarity, an empty solidarity, not through ideas of social 
criticism and emancipation, but instead in the management of expedient moral sentiments 
and care-taking. What is worse, many seem to believe that good intentions are enough. As 
humanitarian organizations increasingly ally themselves with governments and corporate 
donors, and by doing that compromise themselves in ways that ultimately corrode their core 
organizational values; it seems that the issue is not how to justify political undertones of a 
shifting humanitarian ideology, but whether and how humanitarianism can sustain its ethics. 
In what follows, I approach this question from two different, and yet interrelated 
perspectives. The first argues that shortcomings of humanitarianism are symptoms of deeper 
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 By denoting ‘West,’ ‘Western subject,’ I do not intend to conflate all members in one nation under 
the heading of ‘privileged’ (or affluent). I am aware that not all citizens of affluent western societies 
have a ‘privileged’ existence. Thus, when I phrase ‘western subject’ or ‘western public’ I have in 
mind individuals who share a certain social status, belong to certain gender, bear certain cultural and 
economic independence, and who have the capacity to provide aid to distant people in need. These 




social and political problems inextricably linked to the nature of humanitarian institutions 
and practices, while the second takes the notion of humanitarian compassion, as the primary 
moral (and political) disposition of the 21
st 
century individual, under critical scrutiny. 
By bringing inconsistencies of humanitarianism into the spotlight I show how 
humanitarianism has degenerated into a system that inextricably serves to govern human 
beings.
2
 We are presented with humanitarianism that is instrumental in nature—one which 
has not been encouraged to question its own means and ends; this feature alone makes it an 
effective servant of militarism and capitalism. Hence, by disclosing pathologies internal to 
the humanitarian system, I hope that I am at the same time pointing at things that a 
reimagined humanitarianism needs to avoid. This brings us to an important question: is there 
an alternative?  
Answering it requires investigations into the current nature of humanitarianism, how it is 
changing, and how it ought to change. Although I address distortions, and pathologies that 
result from humanitarian practices and individual agency, my aim is not only to disclose 
present inequalities and limits of Western humanism at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. My motivation is to also make humanitarianism transparent to itself and chart a path 
toward a different kind of humanism altogether. To do so, my work here approaches 
humanitarian practices from the standpoint of an imagined, alternative understanding of 
humanitarianism (and solidarity); one which remains critical towards itself and considers 
challenges tied with nature and the limits of an unjust institutional order plagued by 
exclusion, violence, and inequality. Ultimately, if we want to avoid repeating the mistakes of 
an outdated humanitarian system of aid and governance, our policies, practices and social 
institutions that enable it require more transparency, self-criticism, creativity and boldness.  
2. LIMITS OF OUR HUMANITARIAN PRESENT 
Humanitarianism today finds itself at crossroads. It is a deeply contested and polarized 
system of values and commitments that is increasingly unfit to face new types of 
emergencies related to increasing global inequalities, poverty, environmental degradation, 
urbanization, and shifting geopolitical dynamics that result in the massive forceful migration 
of people. It is truly remarkable how despite decades long growth of international institutions 
and norms governing the humanitarian sector, and despite the undeniable increase in public 
awareness of the experiences of people who suffer under such conditions, there has been 
relatively little substantive change in the ways how humanitarian principles and practices 
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 What remains a task for the future is a thorough empirical analysis of the structural aspects 
of humanitarianism (e.g. workings of institutions, agencies; their practices, implementation of policies, 
etc.). Some humanitarian mechanisms that require critical scrutiny are poor coordination, exacerbating 
existing problems, damage to accountability and trust due to malpractice, corruption, etc. In the face of the 
current refugee crisis, for example, the oppression and various forms of exclusion faced by refugees 
(especially female refugees) demonstrate the structural limits of the present institutionalized humanitarian 
refugee and asylum system. The outdated and gendered nature of these political structures leaves refugees 
with terrible choices: internal displacement, sexual violence, squalid refugee camps, enslavement, urban 
destitution or dangerous migration. This, in effect, denies them effective protection and amounts to their 







 There seems to be a growing inclination of the ‘Western’ public to engage with the 
suffering of distant others, especially if we consider the ongoing development of information 
technologies (and ways in which media outlets articulate awareness to acute hardship across 
the globe), and yet humanitarian impact often seems feeble and impotent.
4
 If we take a more 
closer look into normative commitments of current humanitarian culture we can see that it 
revolves around a discrepancy between moral universalism (i.e. claim that every human 
being deserves equal moral concern – has equal moral value) and unequal exposure to 
vulnerabilities grounded in historical and ongoing political and economic forms of 
marginalization. This discrepancy allows us to approach humanitarianism not only as a 
system of care-giving, but rather as set of ideas and practices that can be located materially 
in their institutional and discursive forms. Reflecting on this multifaceted nature of 
humanitarianism, Didier Fassin insightfully notes that it ultimately stands for a system of 
governance that designates “the deployment of moral sentiments in contemporary politics.” 
(Fassin 2011: 2) Indeed, humanitarianism has always focused on the impact of its discourse 
on the attitudes of the public, and as such it represents a system of governance that deploys 
and manipulates moral sentiments in the public sphere (i.e. feelings of sympathy, 
compassion, empathy, resentment, etc.). Governance here should be understood in a broad 
sense, as a set of procedures established and actions conducted in order to manage and 
regulate the existence of human beings and harm that they are exposed to; while ‘moral 
sentiments’ refer to emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and motivate 
us to remedy their suffering. (Fassin 2011) 
 
This interconnection between regulative practices and invocation of moral sentiments 
displays the complex role and value of moral emotions in contemporary politics. The 
political economy of moral sentiments is evident in ways in which it nourishes political 
discourses and legitimizes political practices, particularly where these discourses and 
practices are focused on the disadvantaged and the dominated, whether at home (e.g. 
historically marginalized social groups such as racial, ethnic and sexual minorities, the poor, 
the immigrants, etc.) or further away (the victims of famine, epidemics, natural disasters, or 
war). Such a complex humanitarian assemblage includes, but also exceeds, the intervention 
of the state, local administrations, international bodies, political institutions more generally, 
spatial organizations, technical standards, procedures and systems of monitoring.  
 
This complex apparatus, of course, has a history. This is not the place to retrace it, but it is 
worth underlining two stages of its development. The first stage relates to the emergence of 
moral sentiments in philosophical reflection and subsequently in intellectual culture from the 
                                                 
3
 Let us consider the humanitarian practices aimed at forcefully displaced people. Most of the 
humanitarian management of refugees takes place in squalling refugee camps. These UN governed 
spaces often do not only fail in providing aid, but structures and policies that these spaces embody, 
directly violate human rights of those who they allegedly intend to help (e.g. sexual and gender-based 
violence, ethnic and religious violence, lack of medical support, lack of freedom of movement, etc.). 
4
 This may be the case due to sheer severity of human deprivation worldwide, but even if that is the 
case, such state of affairs requires from us to redefine methods we use, and goals we aim to achieve by 




eighteenth century onward. To address the general characteristics of compassion it is 
necessary to start with the basic assumption that human beings have a predisposition to be 
concerned with the wellbeing of others and that under certain circumstances exposure to the 
pain or suffering of others can elicit moral reactions among spectators. Historically, early 
modern thinkers have made human passion a central topic of moral and political theory, 
arguing that compassion is one of the inherent aspects of being human. Thus, modern 
subjectivity and identity cannot be seen independent from the conjunction of affects and 
values that regulate conduct and emotion toward others based on a respect for human life and 
dignity. The second, more recent development, relates to the articulation of these moral 
sentiments in the public sphere and in political action, during the second half of the twentieth 
century onward. While it is difficult to determine a precise date when this development 
started, one may note that increased convergence of diverse measures and initiatives over the 
past three-four decades have been defined explicitly or implicitly as a humanitarian. Such 
measures and initiatives include (but are not limited to) the creation of diverse humanitarian 
organizations, the development of governmental ministries that deal with humanitarian 
assistance, and the public presentation of various conflicts worldwide as humanitarian crises 
(which then justifies military intervention under the same banner), the proliferation of 
initiatives and regulations designed to aid the marginalized parts of society (i.e. the poor, the 
unemployed, the homeless, people without healthcare protection, immigrants, and applicants 
for refugee/Asylum status, etc.). Although there is a significant time gap between these two 
phases, they are nonetheless interconnected, and the development of recent humanitarian 
practices draw their genealogical framework from the philosophical discourse on moral 
sentiments.  
 
This latter phase is the one that I am principally interested here. Despite inherent difficulties 
with the philosophical foundation of humanitarianism, my primary goal is to offer an 
account of the shifting nature of what can be called the politics of precarious lives over the 
past few decades. (Butler 2004, 2009) Alongside the technological developments in recent 
years, there is an ongoing shift in discursive formation reflected in an increased public 
presence of humanitarian conundrums in an unjust world. The ongoing translation of social 
reality into the new language of compassion (and a development of practices that embody 
such language) seems to mirror the West’s epistemological and affective conversion of 
individual and collective moral capacity. I have talked about this process in more details 
elsewhere, but at this point it is necessary to mention that there are inevitable constraints 
under which knowledge of human suffering and hardships that humanitarian victims 
experience takes place. Even though portrayals of human suffering encompass a significant 
part of our understanding of instances of injustices, there lies the danger that the Western 
individual is unable to receive what a humanitarian victim has to say due to failed 
linguistic/testimonial exchange, and/or sheer ignorance. Here too, cultural prejudices and 
asymmetry of power in such epistemic interactions serve as a threshold for determining why 
often social inclusion fails even if the institutional setting has enabled space for management 
of people who are target of our humanitarian efforts. (Ivanovic 2018)  
 
Despite the proliferation of literature that deals with suffering and trauma, and the fact that 




humanitarianism ultimately seems to be the politics of inequality. There is often a form of 
cynicism at play when one deploys the language of moral sentiments at the same time as 
implementing policies that increase social inequality, regulations that restrict the rights and 
liberties of asylum seekers and their children, or military operations with essentially 
geostrategic goals.
5
 From this perspective, the language of humanitarianism seems to be 
nothing more than a deceptive cover for the imposition of unjust and brutal market forces of 
an equally unjust and brutal world. But even if this is the case, and I think it is, the question 
still remains: Why does it work so well?  
3. ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK? 
In order to answer this question, it is not enough to ask how humanitarianism generates 
support among general public. We must instead focus on explaining why people often prefer 
to invoke the idea of suffering and compassion instead of justice.
6
 Traditionally, 
humanitarianism has been located at the intersection of ethics and politics, and, often 
dramatically, demonstrates the interdependence of these spheres. Understanding its 
emergence and implications requires more than simply examining the history of 
humanitarianism’s attempts to address human vulnerability. It is only by exploring how 
humanitarian discourse is organized by political and economic forces (as well as the cultural 
values that sustain and contest them) that we can grasp the impact this discourse has on 
individuals and their agency. This impact is not always immediately evident. Despite its 
benign objectives, humanitarianism tends to accept divisions and inequalities that it 
                                                 
5
 Let us consider present situation in refugee camps scattered around arid areas in Jordan, Turkey, 
Kenya, Malawi, etc. The founding statute of UNHCR outlines two main roles: to provide protection to 
refugees and to find a long-term solution to their plight. Neither of these goals are being met. 
International humanitarian aid programs are desperately underfunded and often cannot meet even the 
most basic needs of an increasing number of displaced people in an ever-shifting landscape of 
personal and group vulnerability. The principal ways the refugee system currently provides protection 
are simply ineffective and outdated. The dominant model, as Betts and Collier see it, leaves other 
alternatives aside and focuses into the long-term provision of assistance in refugee camps and closed 
settlements. At first, designed to attend to immediate needs of refugees, camps have since become the 
dominant practice of humanitarian governance. (Betts and Collier: 2017, 52) Frequently located in 
remote, arid and insecure border areas, refugee camps facilitate the disheartening reduction of what 
was once distinctively human to merely biological. As people begin to settle into their new life in the 
camp, they quickly realize that there is no future for them. Refugees are given food and shelter but not 
freedom to pursue their individual aspirations. They are usually not permitted to work legally, and 
there is little they are allowed to do to improve their own situation. For refugees, “resigning yourself 
to a refugee camp meant putting your life on pause, receiving just enough food and water to get 
through the next day, but robbed of any chance to provide for a family or plan for a future.” 
(McDonald – Gibson 2016a, 80) What at first was intended to be emergency relief turned into long-
term containment and the denial of basic human rights and dignity. 
6
 There is a dramatic distance between the top and the bottom billion in the world. The affluent 
nations and their most affluent citizens have become powerful beyond the wildest imaginations, and 
yet the poorest three billion live in the same abject misery as before. Despite ongoing international 
efforts to contain a range of conflicts across the world, the brutality of armed forces and the suffering 
of the innocents remain a tragic reality for millions. Of course, these patterns of violence harm the 
most vulnerable individuals due to the intersection of different layers of oppression and exclusion, 




otherwise aims to efface. There are serious problems in many of its facets; these faults are 
both subjective and institutional in nature. The reach and effectiveness of a humanitarian 
ethic are compromised by tendencies toward excessive individualism, (Eurocentric) cultural 
universalism, and moral selectivism. Positioned between the spectator as a fully sovereign 
agent, and the humanitarian victim who remains the passive target of humanizing efforts, 
humanitarianism ultimately reinforces, rather than bridges, the distance between two distinct 
moral perspectives. This division is reflected in the articulation and representations of human 
suffering and subsequent formation of social conscience manifested in sentiments of 




The predominant neoliberal understanding of compassion thrives on its premises to enlarge 
the moral and political boundaries of communities and to engender equal respect across 
contingent geopolitical and cultural contexts. Yet in practice, it seems not only that this 
sentiment does not deliver on its moral and political promises, but rather it imposes limits on 
agency that lead to further entrenchment of victimhood and exclusion. By diminishing the 
moral and political agency of recipients, it fails to redress the injustices it identifies, it 
exhausts empathetic identification (i.e. resulting in desensitization, compassion fatigue, 
voyeurism, etc.) and, in addition it generates indifference and political fatigue. 
To explore this claim further, it is important to understand the circumstances under which 
compassionate dispositions towards others may develop (or fail to do so). Specifically, it is 
necessary to understand how social positions of individuals and formations of identities of 
the other influence the potential for mobilizing solidarity towards them as distant strangers. I 
understand compassion as ‘the feeling that arises witnessing another’s suffering and that 
motivates a subsequent desire to help.’ (Goetz et all. 2010, 351) This ability to feel the 
suffering or misfortune of others contains within itself an appraisal of the seriousness of 
various predicaments that the other experiences and centers upon a concern for ameliorating 
their suffering. Attempts to understand how our sentimental attachments to others might be 
fashioned for the purpose of social reforms (and equity) is nothing new; as we could see 




 Such accounts 
come close to suggesting that compassion grounds ordinary systems of care that give people 
a sense of connection, meaning and solidarity. We are all vulnerable creatures, prey to 
physical and psychological wounding; thus, one important aspect of our sociality is an 
inability to see ourselves independent from others. Given this innate human vulnerability, at 
least some form of minimal solidarity between social actors is necessary in order for social 
attachments to make sense.
 
 
                                                 
7. See Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Politics, Morality and the Media (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship of Suffering (London: Sage, 2006) and 
The Ironic Spectator (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Kate Nash, “Global Citizenship as Show Business: 
the Cultural Politics of Make Poverty History.” Media, Culture & Society  30/2 (2008): 167 – 81 
8
 In an attempt to understand why people might be motivated by moral feeling to care for others, 
Rousseau argues that the possibility to act compassionately towards others is lodged deep inside us, 
and as such is a natural disposition present in all humans. He argues that one can either choose to 
ignore this feeling and defy what is essentially part of human nature, or to cultivate the experience of 




Historically, we have seen that this moralizing process depends upon the capacity of 
privileged people to imagine themselves in the position of those who are less fortunate.
9
 If 
we look at contemporary political culture we see that it has come to encompass a wide range 
of mediated practices that rely on our social capacity to nurture this moral imagination in an 
attempt to make this disposition to act compassionately a public imperative. This is 
important not only because it is essential to focus on the ways in which human misfortune is 
presently mediated and articulated, but also because such articulation sets norms that subtly 
regulate our capacity to recognize ourselves as actors upon the unjust conditions of others. 
While most of the contemporary humanitarian discourse relies on documentation and 
representation of human suffering in order to cultivate a relationship to distant others and 
move the Western public into action, the ways in which our witnessing of inhumane 
conditions succeeds (or fails) in establishing moral bonds with victims tells us a lot about the 
social processes in which we seem to be formed as moral (and political) actors. Although the 
insistence of humanitarianism on the moral acknowledgment of the unfortunate conditions of 
others highlights the obvious importance of compassion and imagination in shaping public 
humanitarian imaginaries, at the same time we also see the difficulties anchored to this view. 
The movement from feeling to action is not straightforward. It is clouded by social 
differentiation and cultural situatedness that are the biggest obstacles for decentering away 
from imperatives of care and moving towards questions of rights, responsibility, and justice. 
Although at the heart of contemporary humanitarianism lies the moral acknowledgment of 
unfortunate others whose suffering calls for public action, such calls also disclose the moral 
distance between those who watch and those who suffer. Despite the innate optimism of 
current Western political culture, compassion itself is manifested as the personal choice of a 
Western consumer; it remains a form of public action insofar as it silences vulnerable others 
by negotiating their humanity as a consumerist practice devoid of genuine solidarity. Even if 
we are able to transcend the contingent social differences that constitute post-modern 
individuals, the moral cornerstone of solidarity that we discover today, bears the form of life 
that has an elementary biological character and lacks all the qualities which make it possible 
to treat it as a life. (Arendt 1998, Agamben 1998) Evoking images of others who are 
suffering, such an encounter between a Western spectator and the gruesome scenes of human 
vulnerability seem to yield only the most basic biological fact: namely that victim feels pain 
and suffering. Thus, recognition of what we share in common with other individuals leads to 
the disheartening reduction of the distinctively human to the merely biological. What this 
reduction does is not only exhaust the concept of humanity, but also through this process of 
exhaustion it creates conditions for the production of a specific form of humanism that 
enables ‘Western’ civilization to identify and define itself. As Jacques Rancière describes 
this feature of contemporary humanitarianism:  
The predicate "human" and "human rights" are simply attributed, without any 
phrasing, without any mediation, to their eligible party, the subject "man." The 
age of the "humanitarian" is one of immediate identity between the ordinary 
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 This identification with the other is, for thinkers like Rousseau, not only an inherent aspect of subject 
formation, but it also accounts for the development of intersubjectivity and the genesis of morality in 
social context in which my encounter with others creates regimes of meanings that enable us to 





example of suffering humanity and the plenitude of the subject of humanity and 
of its rights. The eligible party pure and simple is then none other than the 
wordless victim, the ultimate figure of the one excluded from the logos, armed 
only with a voice expressing a monotonous moan, the moan of naked suffering, 
which saturation has made inaudible. More precisely, this person who is merely 
human then boils down to the couple of the victim, the pathetic figure of a 
person to whom such humanity is denied, and the executioner, the monstrous 




The irony of this ‘monotonous moan’ is that humanitarian solidarity today carries within 
itself virtually all of the vices of a Eurocentric hegemonic order that sustains power relations 
between the West and the global south. Thus, the convenient fiction of human equality 
remains just that – a fiction.  
These fundamental dependencies and inequalities invoke fear that Western moral sentiments 
ultimately promote configurations of power that legitimizes the corrupt global order and the 
inequalities that it engenders. Interfering in the current struggle over the boundaries between 
humanitarianism, the economy, and politics, the explicit invocation of justice is the only 
morally legitimate alternative to the neoliberal imaginary and its dehumanizing processes. 
And yet, before we can chart the ways in which this shift is possible, there are other 
problems that demand our attention. One way to think through the challenges of 
humanitarianism is to conceive the contemporary humanitarian agency of Western spectators 
as a form of subjectivity that has inadequate conceptions of motivation or inadequate goals 
in regard to solidarity with vulnerable others. Hence, solidarity as personal preference not 
only constitutes the West as a self-assertive, narcissistic public, it also constitutes the 
vulnerability of the other, often as a semi-fictional figure that inhabits epistemological limbo 
wherein the Western public negotiates her ontological and moral worth. Thus, just as the 
solidarity of the Western humanitarian agent belongs to the private realm of personal choices 
and affections, whereby often these choices appear to be made independently of the 
configurations of social powers that actually constitute and define them, the Non-Western 
other is disposed of her vulnerability and thrown into the realm of public negotiations as an 
image of human suffering that awaits Western acknowledgment.  
As a consequence, these images lack historicity and any concrete link to justice. Even if 
these representations are linked to historical circumstances and sustain an impotent rhetoric 
of common humanity, their depiction in public imagery does not present those people as 
historical agents who are part of a world that invokes a sense of solidarity and obligations. 
Rather, their agonizing experiences are reduced to a process of distributing resources, 
wherein the relation between the Western spectator and Non-Western victim is negotiated 
both materially and symbolically. The suffrage of the humanitarian victim, consequently, is 
manifested as a personal experience of the Western bystander who remains ignorant of the 
moral and political weight inherently entailed in the inhumane conditions faced by the other. 
Hence, it is not the case that stories of humanitarian tragedies lack a ‘vocabulary of justice’ 
but, rather, that such stories lack autonomy in the sense that their experiences and relation to 
responsibility and justice is subordinated to experiences of the Western humanitarian agent 
and stories about ‘the West.’ Hence, the notion of shared humanity cannot be taken as 




construct of diverse material and discursive practices which selectively humanize certain 
groups of people rather than others. (Quijano, 2008) Closely linked to this notion of 
‘humanitarian’ selectivism is the complex overdetermination of the subject’s moral and 
political dispositions by social institutions that ultimately articulate and manage social and 
global maladies.  
4. THE DARK SIDE OF COMPASSION 
Despite much elaborated rhetoric, compassion remains a controversial and unreliable ethical 
and political motive. The critics in their various disciplinary iterations, conceive of 
compassion to be far too partial, inconsistent and unreliable to rely on as a moral and 
political drive. As we could see above, it motivates actions and policies that: unwittingly 
entrench victimhood and exclusion rather than create agency; express itself as a shaming pity 
that diminishes its recipients and fails to redress injustices it identifies; exhaust empathetic 
identification and generates indifference and fatigue; and worse still, is profoundly 
connected to subordination, exploitation and domination. While I do not intend to 
completely reject the political and moral worth of the idea of compassion, I do think it is 
necessary to disclose the ways in which it can go dangerously awry, what in turn jeopardizes 
an impartial application of principles of justice that is important to advance. 
Even though the moralizing potential of ‘sympathetic identification’ constitutes the 
disposition to act compassionately, such a disposition does not automatically arise as the 
consequence of the sight of suffering as such.
10
 Rather it inheres in the capacity of the 
society to humanize the other, and as such incite the spectators’ identification with the 
victim. (Boltanski 1999, Chouliriaki 2013) If one wants to understand why people might be 
motivated by moral feelings to care for distant others, one has to first disclose the social and 
cultural conditions that delimit our comprehension and affective response when confronted 
with scenes of human suffering. Despite the much-celebrated rhetoric of contemporary 
proponents of humanitarian compassion, their claim that the experience of the suffering of 
others serves to radically transform our political outlooks and moral dispositions, our 
historical record of growing social and global inequalities, actually reveals the opposite 
tendency. (Nussbaum 1996, 2001) It is also very likely that the moral and political 
contradictions that arise for people in connection with the experience of being positioned as 
remote witness of distant suffering complicate the compassionate sensibility insofar as the 
latter depends on the increased mediation of human misfortune through what some scholars 
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 As mentioned earlier, the concept of ‘sympathetic identification’ was developed by J.J. Rousseau. It 
remains an important aspect of his theory of compassion that serves as a foundation of civic 
sensibilities and educational practices. Both, The Discourse and Emile, show that whether or not we 
follow ‘voice of compassion’ depends on our ability to recognize and identify with one another. 
Because of our dependence on other people, and because of the way trauma affects us, one way to 
comprehend weight of conditions that some parts of humanity are experiencing depends on our 
capacity to transcend ourselves and the illusion of self-sufficiency by taking a perspective of the other 
person. This identification with the other is, for classical enlightenment thinkers, not only an inherent 
aspect of subject formation, but it also accounts for the development of intersubjectivity and the 
genesis of morality in social context in which our encounter with others creates regimes of meanings 
that enable me to mediate knowledge about the world around and potentially efface the difference that 




identified as complicity between technology and increasing inequalities of a world driven by 
market profits and history of violence. (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947/2002)  
Hence, political agency that results in compassion can take various forms, and resulting 
political action might have various outcomes. What is more important, being compassionate 
establishes a relation between social actors where the causes of suffering and vulnerability 
already set up the context between the political agents active within the political system and 
the victims of injustice who are excluded from the exercise of political agency. Compassion 
conceived in this way is a practice that not only polarizes humanity into the beneficiaries of 
compassionate acts and agents who are providing the aid, but also as a mechanism of 
‘othering’ that navigates pitfalls of global economy, colonial history, historical and present 
injustices, and a private calculable logic of sentimental obligations towards vulnerable others 
on the side of Western consumer. (Chouliaraki 2013, 5) Hence, despite its focus on human 
vulnerability as the clearest manifestation of common humanity, it is an awful paradox that a 
life in which we devotedly strive for shaping dependencies is already grounded in an 
asymmetry and difference in the vulnerabilities we experience. While compassion in its 
humanitarian renderings takes this human vulnerability as the starting point, it also 
simultaneously evokes the language and workings of power, wherein a constitutive 
dimension of compassionate behavior appears to rest on inherent difference in social 
positions that benefactors and beneficiaries share.
11
  
The central question, then, for contemporary proponents of the ethical and political 
dispositions grounded in compassion is whether we can ever feel commiseration for another 
without somehow invoking our self and our standing relative to the conditions that shape and 
affect us and other human beings. Today, a constitutive dimension of humanitarian discourse 
organized around nurturing compassion among the Western public does not take place 
among the individuals who confront one another as universal bearers of humanity (and rights 
that follow from it), but instead are subsequently and inevitably marked by contingent 
differences (e.g. male, female, poor, black, white, disabled, Christian, Muslim, etc.). Even if 
the initial effect of an encounter with the other reveals the vulnerability we all share as 
sensible human beings, the next and inevitable aspect of intersubjective recognition is its 
dependence on the layers of our subjectivity that are conventional, particular and alien. 
Hence, imagining ourselves in the position of another creates challenges for different agents, 
because different social groups share different cognitive and material dispositions for 
experiencing their environment and other human beings. Mapped onto the broader 
asymmetry between the affluent and poor, white and black, and male and female, 
contemporary humanitarian arrangements render the mediation of afflicted parts of humanity 
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 The danger that lurks underneath such processes is a continuous risk of transforming our moral 
bonds with vulnerable others into narcissistic self-expression that has little to do with solidarity and 
aid. In blurring the boundaries between witnessing and acting, one reduces the encounter between the 
Western spectator and the humanitarian victim from an ethical and political event to an often 
narcissistic self-reflection that turns our actions into mechanism of ‘othering.’ At the heart of this 
reduction lies a deeper concern—namely, that despite its benign objectives, humanitarianism (and our 
dispositions of solidarity and compassion that it aims to advance) in general ultimately follows rules 
of neoliberal logic of management and control. In the context of such critiques, humanitarianism may 
deprive us not only of the voice of vulnerable others, but also of a moral discourse that would link 




mainly through cultivation of the ethical dispositions that are undermined by the same 
differences that humanitarians want to highlight and overcome. We are consequently much 
more likely to lose touch with the sensible voice of compassion insofar as we are socially 
constituted, wherein such constitution defines the limits of our ability to imagine ourselves in 
the position of the other.
 
 Following directly from this systematic gap between social actors, 
the difference between distinct social groups explains not only why we are so often 
incapable of mobilizing a generous ethos of engagement across these disparities, but also 
why differences so often result in insensitivity, ignorance, and subsequently cruelty and 
violence.  
5. FIRST STEPS TOWARDS NEW FORMS OF SOLIDARITY 
Critical social philosophy has traditionally been suspicious of the moralizing potential of 
compassion to address human deprivation and vulnerability as an object of critical reflection 
and deliberation. To this end, I take my point of departure in Adorno’s critical iteration of 
the limits and inconsistencies of an ethics of compassion. His major line of criticism is 
centered on the view that an ethics of compassion sets out only to mitigate injustice, and not 
actually to change the conditions that create and reproduce it. Rather than challenge the 
social contexts that give rise to human suffering, compassionate behavior takes such contexts 
as a starting point, and at least implicitly resigns itself to them. Given Adorno’s emphasis on 
human suffering and on moral impulses generated in response to it, it is precisely this 
inadvertent character of compassionate behavior that ultimately defines its limits and 
determines the value of our actions that are related to others. As he elaborates on this theme 
in one of his lectures: 
This is because the concept of compassion tacitly maintains and gives its 
sanction to the negative condition of powerlessness in which the object of our 
pity finds itself. The idea of compassion contains nothing about changing the 
circumstances that give rise to the need for it, but instead, as in Schopenhauer, 
these circumstances are absorbed into the moral doctrine and interpreted as its 
main foundation. In short, they are hypostatized and treated as if they were 
immutable. We may conclude from this that pity you express for someone 
always contains an element of injustice towards that person; he experiences 
not just our pity but also impotence and the specious character of the 
compassionate act. (Adorno 1963/2001: 173-4) 
 
Adorno’s criticism seems to rest on two distinct, though related, considerations. First, 
compassion does not entail address of the cultural, economic, legal or political context of the 
victims’ suffering. The benefactor responds exclusively to the bare fact of the victim’s 
deprivation, while for social criticism it is of crucial importance to track and address its 
systematic causes. Such a depoliticized understanding of compassion, Adorno argues, 
occludes the political dimensions of suffering which leaves victims without proper means to 
invoke questions of justice and responsibility of individuals and collectives accountable for 
their misfortune. This inadequacy of compassion is entailed not only in its contingent 
character of people’s capacity for compassionate behavior, but also in the fact that this 




differently, whereas compassionate behavior partially enables the alleviation of human 
suffering in some cases, it also simultaneously conceals the act’s own complicity with 
relations of power that result in such unjust conditions and subsequently divide humanity 
into subjects with agency and vulnerable others. Second, Adorno seems to insist that we 
address the hard question of whether and how we can formulate and institutionalize a type of 
compassion that fully acknowledges and addresses the political agency of victims. He 
remains suspicious towards the nature of relation that is established between the benefactor 
and the victim who is the target of compassionate acts, a relationship whereby the figure of 
the spectator is fully sovereign in her agency over the victim, whereas the victim remains a 
passive target of humanizing efforts. Unlike mainstream political culture, which assumes a 
universal character of compassion exercised as moral solidarity between equal members of 
humanity, Adorno urges us to be aware of subordinating, voyeuristic and narcissistic 
dispositions of compassion, wherein modern subjects enjoy the sense of her own superiority 
through acts of passionate engagement with the suffering of others, at the same time 
fortifying the vulnerability of the victim. In this sense, the act of compassion does not bridge 
the moral distance between those who watch and those who suffer, but ultimately intensifies 
such distance by establishing different social status between benefactors and beneficiaries.  
These criticisms notwithstanding, there is also another lesson to be taken from Adorno’s 
analysis. Although his critique takes as a starting point the breakdown of the referential 
function of compassion in regard to the nature of human agency and sociopolitical conditions 
that give rise to injustice and atrocities, the advantageous effects of this breakdown could be 
seen as an arousal to critically reflect upon the possible ways to redress the effects of those 
conditions. In order to escape the shortcomings of a depoliticized account of compassion, 
such critical reflection of causes of suffering entails that compassion needs to be 
accompanied by an insight wherein our response to suffering is connected with awareness of 
the culpability of prevailing sociopolitical conditions and our own complicity and privilege. 
Rather than merely legitimizing claims for solidarity by confronting the urgency of human 
suffering, the moralizing function of this insight relies on the emergence of new dispositions 
of solidarity that invite us to render deep asymmetries of power and injustice the very object 
of our reflection and engagement. This not only shifts the role that compassion has for 
constituting moral or political agency, but also more importantly, it offers an alternative 
vision of morality in general, wherein moral practice becomes ‘a right form of politics’ and a 
critique of society. (Adorno 1963/2001, 176) 
This is possible only by looking beyond others’ distress to its causes; political compassion 
establishes the conditions necessary for anger or indignation. Anger motivated by political 
compassion, Adorno maintains, has an important cognitive and political function—it alerts 
states and citizens to the sources of harm and suffering that require political redress and 
focuses our compassion on its systematic causes. While this connection to social justice does 
not necessarily give compassion any explicit role (beyond a general obligation to attend to 
suffering and its causes) a more specific contribution of Adorno’s work to thinking about 
political compassion is to suggest the possibility that our moral sentiments and critical 
reflection can be a justified element in politics as an impetus to and a sustaining force of 
political agency and action. In arguing that compassion requires more than mere charity, 
Adorno allows for bringing our understanding of the moral sentiment into the sphere of 




to be a result of systematic injustice and distorted social conditions. Even then another 
problem remains: there are no guarantees that knowledge about the causes of social 
injustices may result in significant changes in human agency. On the contrary, exclusionary 
practices often depend upon the fact that dehumanization and indifference take place 
regardless of knowledge or awareness of the social agents. 
6. CONCLUSION: BEYOND HUMANITARIANISM 
In retrospect, drawing upon what I have introduced in so far, it seems that the moral and 
political methodology of humanitarianism relies, on the one hand, on the representation of 
vulnerability that carries with itself the moral claim to common humanity, and on the other, 
the assumption that such knowledge motivates the public to act. Compassion, in this sense, 
constitutes the dominant figure of a natural inclination to care for others, which is the 
cornerstone of humanitarian philanthropy that is the dominant practice for today’s 
management of human deprivation worldwide. I have argued that by invoking human 
vulnerability and suffering as the moral cornerstones of solidarity, humanitarianism collapses 
important political questions of responsibility and (global) justice with moralizing 
discourses, around which the Western public is called to organize a charitable action towards 
the misfortune of Non-Western others. Ironically enough, compassion and the representation 
of human suffering—the two structural aspects of the humanitarianism—have failed to 
mobilize and sustain moral dispositions to act on the vulnerability of others. We have seen 
from preceding pages that compassion cultivates a flawed disposition of solidarity, which 
often ignores the historical injustices and contemporary inequalities sustained by a 
dehumanizing logic of the global market and neoliberalism (this is most evident in the 
widespread indifference and moral selectivism of the Western humanitarian public). 
Whereas the analysis of compassion discloses the limits of liberal discourses of care and 
responsibility, the suspicion towards humanitarian institutions and practices raises another 
set of problems. 
Despite its benign objectives, I argued that the humanitarian regime in its current form 
ultimately legitimizes the neoliberal logic of the market that turns altruistic aspirations of 
contemporary humanitarianism into the concealed aspirations of a global economy, and the 
political interests of affluent countries. In doing so it not only fails to serve its moral and 
political purpose, but perpetuates a questionable climate of dependence that has harmful 
effects on vulnerable others, a dependence which often masks traces of historical injustices 
and ongoing exploitation. In blurring the boundaries between sociopolitical conditions, 
spectatorship and action, I challenged the contemporary conception of compassion as moral 
and political drive, and the ways in which such sentiment has been cultivated through 
institutions and presupposed objectified perceptions of the human deprivation.  
Finally, we can now ask what remains of the idea of humanitarianism once we have 
considered the ideological tendencies and pathologies that I have outlined in this paper. Far 
from offering a comprehensive guide to public action, my analysis has modest emancipatory 
aims. Building upon the ongoing dehumanization of humanitarian institutions and practices, 
it invites us to carefully consider how we may develop a kind of solidarity that enables 
persons to realize how and when their sentiments become ideological and inappropriate. For 




culture is composed of ambivalent moral and political perspectives, which in turn rely on 
violence, the economy, and the media to inform and regulate how our epistemic practices 
govern articulation of others and how formation of their ontologies bears on political 
dispositions. Overcoming such determinations requires the difficult work of trying to 
understand our social environment and to accept how our privilege is complicit with 
exclusionary nature of policies and institutions that enable our living standards amidst 
appalling conditions that billions are forced to endure. At the same time, this needs to ensure 
that sense of our obligations towards less-fortunate others does not jeopardize their 
autonomy, individuality, and dignity. This is not an easy task, because it requires us to 
surrender the privileged spaces that we comfortably inhabit and to venture beyond our social 
immediacy.  
The first step towards this goal is to find the right balance between the need for standardized 
approaches and the need to adapt to unique contexts and challenges for each specific 
humanitarian crisis. A reimagined humanitarian regime must work for everyone, not just for 
fortunate few who reach gates of ‘civilized Europe.’ On both ends of the humanitarian 
sector, institutions and general public, we need to cultivate a different sense of obligation or 
we risk ignoring an important opportunity to affect the lives of people in a more meaningful 
(and long-lasting) way. For humanitarianism to fulfill this role, it has to rethink the 
foundations of its ethics, change its normative commitments from charity to justice, detach 
from universalizing patriarchic discursive hegemonies, reimagine its methodology and 
reconstruct institutional organization in order to strive towards a more inclusive approach 
towards afflicted individuals. Hence, it is necessary to focus on developing humanitarian 
sustainability. As the nature of humanitarian crises change we are witnessing the increase in 
number of those affected. Such sustainability focuses on restoring the autonomy of 
individuals who are target of humanitarian efforts. After immediate relief, humanitarian 
policies and institutions should focus on enabling environment that promotes self-sufficiency 
and development. Of course, empowering nature of these development projects will depend 
on the specific social context and requires certain creativity (and flexibility) in improving 
social resilience of those affected. In other words, the precise models of humanitarian 
development will vary across different contexts that will take into consideration nature of 
economic circumstances (i.e. are the nation’s economies agricultural, industry oriented, or 
focused on service). Hence, the key is in creating long term development opportunities 
where the second tier of humanitarian efforts is on generating opportunities in the aftermath 
of immediate relief.   
In the end, how should we achieve these objectives? In order to ensure that humanitarian 
victims thrive rather than merely survive, every feasible change in ways how 
humanitarianism works today needs to focus on provision of autonomy for victims of 
humanitarian crises (victims such as refugees, IDPs, victims of famine, violence, etc.). 
Empowering people will allow them to engage in rebuilding their lives and making an 
impact on social circumstances that surround them. We need to realize that humanitarian 
response is never ‘humanitarian’ response alone, and that success of humanitarian practices 
often depends on the institutional capacity to creatively interact with different ‘policy fields:’ 
development, human rights, humanitarianism, community and environmental sustainability, 
economic and ecological resilience, etc. (Betts and Collier 2017, 239) How we understand 




part will allow transformation of the nature of our moral and political responsibilities. If we 
want to avoid repeating mistakes of an outdated humanitarian system our agency, and social 
institutions that enable it, require more transparency, self-criticism, creativity and disclosure. 
On both ends of humanitarian sector, institutions and general public, we need to cultivate 
different sense of obligations, otherwise we are ignoring an important opportunity to affect 
lives of people in a more meaningful (and longstanding) way. For humanitarianism to fulfill 
this role it has to rethink foundations of its ethics, reimagine its methodology, and 
reconstruct institutional organization in order to strive towards a more development-based 
approach. 
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